



# CAST-256

## A Submission for the Advanced Encryption Standard

Carlisle Adams  
First AES Candidate Conference  
August 20-22, 1998



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# “Vital Statistics”

## ◆ Name

- CAST-256

## ◆ Inventors

- Carlisle Adams, Howard Heys, Stafford Tavares, Michael Wiener

## ◆ Key Sizes

- 128, 160, 192, 224, 256 bits

## ◆ Block Size

- 128 bits



# Outline

- ◆ History
- ◆ Description
- ◆ Analysis
- ◆ “Features and Advantages”
- ◆ Conclusions



# History

## ◆ 1985-86

- Advice: “don’t go into crypto.; no future”

## ◆ 1988-90

- design procedure for symmetric ciphers
  - Boolean functions, s-boxes, round functions, key scheduling, overall framework

## ◆ 1992-93

- the name “CAST” introduced
- specification of various parameters
- CAST-1, CAST-2 in first Entrust product



# History (cont'd)

## ◆ 1993-95

- modified key schedule: CAST-3
- further concentration on round function
- further concentration on s-box design, efficient (networked) construction
  - preliminary s-boxes: CAST-4
  - final s-boxes: CAST-5
- CAST-5 published as “CAST-128”

## ◆ 1995-97

- draft paper distributed and on web site
- interest begins to rise



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# History (cont'd)

## ◆ 1997

- CAST paper published (DCC)
- CAST-128 cipher published (RFC 2144)
- interest rises significantly

## ◆ 1997-98

- CAST-128 used to form basis of CAST-256

## ◆ 1998

- CSE endorsement of CAST-128
- CAST-256 submitted as AES candidate




# Description

- ◆ Based on CAST-128
  - identical round function
- ◆ Expansion to 128-bit block
  - simple generalization of Feistel structure
- ◆ Expansion to 256-bit key
  - uses encryption (256-bit block) to generate round keys





# Feistel Network






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# “Incomplete” Feistel Network



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
# CAST-256 Notation

$$b \leftarrow Q_i(b) \left\{ \begin{array}{l} C = C \oplus f_1(D, k_{r_0}^{(i)}, k_{m_0}^{(i)}) \\ B = B \oplus f_2(C, k_{r_1}^{(i)}, k_{m_1}^{(i)}) \\ A = A \oplus f_3(B, k_{r_2}^{(i)}, k_{m_2}^{(i)}) \\ D = D \oplus f_1(A, k_{r_3}^{(i)}, k_{m_3}^{(i)}) \end{array} \right.$$

“Forward Quad-Round”

$$b \leftarrow \bar{Q}_i(b) \left\{ \begin{array}{l} D = D \oplus f_1(A, k_{r_3}^{(i)}, k_{m_3}^{(i)}) \\ A = A \oplus f_3(B, k_{r_2}^{(i)}, k_{m_2}^{(i)}) \\ B = B \oplus f_2(C, k_{r_1}^{(i)}, k_{m_1}^{(i)}) \\ C = C \oplus f_1(D, k_{r_0}^{(i)}, k_{m_0}^{(i)}) \end{array} \right.$$

“Reverse Quad-Round”



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# CAST-256 Cipher

$\mathbf{b}$  = 128 bits of plaintext.

*for*( $i = 0; i < 6; i ++$ )

$\mathbf{b} \leftarrow Q_i(\mathbf{b})$

*for*( $i = 6; i < 12; i ++$ )

$\mathbf{b} \leftarrow \overline{Q}_i(\mathbf{b})$

128 bits of ciphertext =  $\mathbf{b}$



# CAST-256 Key Schedule

$k = ABCDEFGH = 256$  bits of primary key,  $K$ .

```
for (i = 0; i < 12; i++) {
     $k \leftarrow w_{2i}(k)$ 
     $k \leftarrow w_{2i+1}(k)$ 
     $k_r^{(i)} \leftarrow k$ 
     $k_m^{(i)} \leftarrow k$ 
}
```

$$k \leftarrow w_i(k) \left\{ \begin{array}{l} G = G \oplus f_1(H, t_{r_0}^{(i)}, t_{m_0}^{(i)}) \\ F = F \oplus f_2(G, t_{r_1}^{(i)}, t_{m_1}^{(i)}) \\ E = E \oplus f_3(F, t_{r_2}^{(i)}, t_{m_2}^{(i)}) \\ D = D \oplus f_1(E, t_{r_3}^{(i)}, t_{m_3}^{(i)}) \\ C = C \oplus f_2(D, t_{r_4}^{(i)}, t_{m_4}^{(i)}) \\ B = B \oplus f_3(C, t_{r_5}^{(i)}, t_{m_5}^{(i)}) \\ A = A \oplus f_1(B, t_{r_6}^{(i)}, t_{m_6}^{(i)}) \\ H = H \oplus f_2(A, t_{r_7}^{(i)}, t_{m_7}^{(i)}) \end{array} \right.$$



# CAST-256 Key Schedule (cont'd)

$$c_m = 2^{30} \sqrt{2} = 5A827999_{16}$$

$$m_m = 2^{30} \sqrt{3} = 6ED9EBA1_{16}$$

$$c_r = 19$$

$$m_r = 17$$

```
for(i = 0; i < 24; i++)  
  for(j = 0; j < 8; j++){  
     $t_{m_j}^{(i)} = c_m$   
     $c_m = (c_m + m_m) \bmod 2^{32}$   
     $t_{r_j}^{(i)} = c_r$   
     $c_r = (c_r + m_r) \bmod 32$   
  }
```



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- ➔ ◆ Analysis

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- ◆ Conclusions



# Analysis

## ◆ *Inherited from CAST-128*

- Boolean functions
- Substitution boxes
- Key mixing per round
- Mixed operations
- Multiple round functions



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# Boolean Functions

- ◆ “Bent” functions of 8 variables
  - highest possible nonlinearity over all binary Boolean functions (120)
  - nonlinear order of 4 (highest possible for bent functions)



# Analysis

## ◆ *Inherited from CAST-128*

- Boolean functions
- **Substitution boxes**
- Key mixing per round
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# S-Boxes

## ◆ Properties

- XOR difference table of 0's and 2's
- nonlinearity of 74
- DMOSAC = 0
- $DHOBIC_{32,1} = 36$
- row weight distribution: approx. binomial
- row pair wt. distribution: approx. binomial
- average column weight: 128



# Analysis

## ◆ *Inherited from CAST-128*

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# Key Mixing

- ◆ Non-surjective attack considerations
  - key entropy per round = 37 bits
- ◆ Differential, Linear considerations
  - combination of masking key, rotation key, and mixed operations for data combining



# Analysis

## ◆ *Inherited from CAST-128*

- Boolean functions
- Substitution boxes
- Key mixing per round
- **Mixed operations**
- Multiple round functions



# Mixed Operations

## ◆ Experimental work

- combinations of *pairs* and *triples* of s-boxes using XOR, addition, subtraction
  - examination of XOR diff. distribution table
  - significant drop in maximum entry

## ◆ Theoretical work

- deriving probability of maximum entry exceeding a specific bound
  - supports experimental evidence



# Mixed Operations (cont'd)

## ◆ Appear to

- increase resistance to linear, differential attacks by decreasing round probability

## ◆ Appear to

- significantly increase resistance to higher-order differential attacks



# Analysis

## ◆ *Inherited from CAST-128*

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# Multiple Round Functions

## ◆ Appear to

- increase complexity of constructing differential and linear characteristics
  - order of round functions precludes iteration of some low-round characteristics



# Analysis (cont'd)

## ◆ *Particular to CAST-256*

- Generalized (“incomplete”) Feistel
  - security of quad-round
  - security of “forward then reverse” quad-rounds
  - number of rounds
- Key schedule
  - security of overall structure
  - equivalent, weak, semi-weak keys



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# “Features and Advantages”

## ◆ History

- CAST design procedure has been under scrutiny for almost 10 years (both public and private)
- minor weaknesses have been found
  - non-surjective attack, HOD attackbut nothing extendable beyond 5-6 rounds
- CAST-128 has received most extensive analysis and appears to be strong
- CAST-256 inherits the strength of the round fn.



# “Features and Advantages” (cont’d)

## ◆ Framework

- generalized Feistel structure is a clean, intuitive design that facilitates understanding and analysis
- single structure for encryption and decryption
- other block sizes can be accommodated, if desired
- 48 rounds is a lot of rounds...!



# “Features and Advantages” (cont’d)

## ◆ Key Schedule

- properties of cipher give properties of round keys (e.g., independence)
- provable non-existence of equivalent keys, unlikelihood of weak and semi-weak keys
- partial knowledge of round keys is of little help



# Conclusion

- CAST-256 is a strong candidate for AES
  - performance is quite good (2/3 that of CAST-128)
  - code size and complexity are reasonable
  - multiple key sizes supported (without any change in performance)
  - multiple block sizes may also be specified
- **Thanks again** to NIST for designing and running the AES process as well as they have!

